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OBJECTIVES

HYPOTHESES

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

RESULTS & DISCUSSION

FINDINGS

RECOMMENDATIONS/SUGGESTIONS

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CONTRIBUTIONS TO BOOKS

- Sharma T., Kwatra, G. (2008) Effectiveness of Social Advertising: A Study of Selected Campaigns, Corporate Social Responsibility, Edited by David Crowther & Nicholas Capaldi, Ashgate Research Companion to Corporate Social Responsibility, Chapter 15, pp 287-303.

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- Schemenner, R.W., Huber, J.C. and Cook, R.L. (1987), "Geographic Differences and the Location of New Manufacturing Facilities," Journal of Urban Economics, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 83-104.

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THE INTERMEDIATE COMMUNITY: A BEHAVIORAL/BARGAINING APPROACH FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION AT THE LOCAL LEVEL/BAYESIAN ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

The paper explores the Nash' equilibrium point and the "Non Cooperative Games Theory" for extension of bargaining solution analyses, applied in the local development field. Social trust and social cohesion conditions (sensitization process) within the Community develop the necessity of building social capital at a local level. That presupposes that the local community builds up a "new local standard," based on local people's sensitized instant reflection behaviour. By its turn, sensitized behaviour must be considered in the frame of any "bargain", between two, taking place inside the Community. "Instrumental rationality" has been proved to be the main obstacle toward the socio-sensitized behaviour in the bargain process. Hence, a scientific dialogue in the socio-philosophical level has been developed on how "instrumental rationality" should co-exist with the "sensitized behaviour" at local levels leading to a "society of citizens." Nash' "bargaining solution" is based on binomial probabilities (p, 1-p) distribution, corresponding 1-1 with those utility functions "prices" (disagreement fear factor). In its extension, which may be the paper's contribution in this academic dialogue, the author hypothesizes that the Intermediate Community (the "C" factor) produces a new behavioural type that converges the interests of both sides at a local level. By converting a binomial distribution ***(p, 1-p)*** *into a trinomial distribution,* ***(p_1, p_2, $1-p_1-p_2$)*** *combined with 3 utility function "prices", the dynamic behavioural sensitization process may converge into the integrated local development limit–end. Thus, the resulted behaviour leads into the absolute cooperation, which steps on the same rules of globalization. The paper, then, argues that this resulted behaviour reflects the end point of the local development process.*

KEYWORDS
Bargain, Behavioral Analysis, Game theory, Intermediate Community, win-win-win papakonstantinidis model.

INTRODUCTION-THE PURPOSE

The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, to point out the interaction between local development, as a part of social capital building in local areas and the games theory, especially, the Nash "non Cooperative Game Theory" including the bargaining problem and focusing on conflict interests within local community, second, to formulate a quick overview on Nash equilibria in the frame of a bargain, as well as Harsanyi's Nash refinement, i.e games with incomplete information, played by bayesian players (or condition probabilities distributions), highlighting the welfare economics vs normative economics and third, to create a base for alternative local development approach, coming from the above mentioned synthesis, so called the "win-win-win papakonstantinidis model"

LOCAL DEVELOPMENT/WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE BARGAIN

Over past decades, the concept of local development, as well, as the "equivalent" social capital at the local level seemed to be out of the scientific dialogue, for the reason that Regional Development Science, coming from the decade of 50's(Isard W, 1956) was the dominant approach of the peripheries economics. Local development, mainly based on social capital building and social networks, has developed in the recent literature. Having its origins in Latin America, current interest in the concept of social capital in the field of national development stems from the limitations of an exclusively economic approach toward the achievement of the basic developmental goals: sustained growth, equity, and democracy Portes A , Landolt P, (2000). The record of application of neoliberal adjustment policies in less developed nations is decidedly mixed, even when evaluated by strict economic criteria. It was the dominant reason that a scientific dialogue open, on Normative and Welfare Economics

In the first half of the twentieth century, most leading economists Pigou A,(1928), Kaldor N,(1939), Samuelson P.A, (1985) etc devoted a significant part of their research effort to normative issues, notably the definition of criteria for the evaluation (Samuelson P.A , 1977) of public policies. The situation is very different nowadays. "Economists do not devote a great deal of time to investigating the values on which their analyses are based. Welfare economics is not a subject which every present-day student of economics is expected to study", who regrets "the strange disappearance of welfare economics". Social capital and social cohesion at the local level with respect to physical, architectural and cultural environment, (Wilkinson K, 1991) may be proved to be the key-point for the local development process At the same time, local people have to continuously negotiate (bargain) each-other expected to derive individual profit from this bargain So it is necessary, costs and benefits of these negotiations be measured Gannon A, (1991).

INTERACTION BETWEEN BARGAIN AND BEHAVIOR (BEHAVIORAL APPROACH)

(Dewey J, and Bentley A, (1949) wrote: *"A behavior is always to be taken transactionally: ie., never as of the organism alone, any more than of the environment alone, but always as of the organic-environmental situation, with organisms and environmental objects taken as equally its aspect".*

In this frame, is there any correlation between bargain and behavior in the bargain and during the bargain?

Experiments in Strategic Interaction" Colin F. Camerer,(2003) defines the behavioral games theory: "Behavioral game theory is about what players *actually* do. It expands analytical theory by adding emotion, mistakes, limited foresight, doubts about how smart others are, and learning to analytical game theory. Behavioral game theory is one branch of behavioral economics, an approach to economics which uses psychological regularity to suggest ways to weaken rationality assumptions and extend theory. Interaction bargain-behavior is the main assumption in this paper Bargainers behavior, is shaped by many factors, but instrumental rationality may be the dominant criterion. At any case, recent literature provides us with the relation between knowledge and behavior So, an overview is attempt (Papakonstantinidis L.A: (2005)**"**, as to find the relation between "knowledge transfer and knowledge creation", in the frame of the "Modern Innovation Theory- M.I.T" (Fischer M.M, 2006 Nonaka and others) Behavior thus may resulted from this knowledge types' synthesis, as the following table.

TABLE: KNOWLEDGE CREATION/ INFORMATION/ TYPES OF BEHAVIOR

Type of Knowledge-1	Type of Knowledge-2	Synthesis	Resulted Behavior
tacit	tacit	Sympathetic	Socialization
tacit	codified	Conceptual	Externalization
codified	tacit	Procedural	Internalization
codified	codified	Systemic	Networking
sympathetic	**systemic**	**Conceptual**	**Sensitization**
systemic	systemic	Procedural	**Strategic**

Papakonstantinidis, 2003

The different examples of knowledge types synthesis and the resulted 1-1 behavior leads us to understand the bargain-behavior assumption, based on information given. From the other hand, bargainer's information may be the dominant result of this cross-related knowledge types.

Despite Nash "complete bargainers information" Harsanyi distinguishes between complete and incomplete information, that each player has from the others bargaining behavior. Thus, the hypothesis of bargain-behavior interaction is very important in building the suggested "Intermediate Community" model: Following the Harsanyi's Bayesian Theorem original game can be replaced by a game "where **nature** first conducts a lottery in accordance with the basic probability distribution" Harsanyi J (1966-revised 1967). Suggested model is mainly based on this point: In my mind, the suggested in the paper "Intermediate Community" and its "win-win-win papakonstantinidis" methodological tool is fully aligned with the "Harsanyi's transformation", with a difference: original bargain between 2 can be replaced by a game, where **intermediate community** first conducts a lottery in accordance with the basic probability distribution. In addition, "Intermediate Community" (the "C" factor) should be seen as the result of a "new" suggested bargaining behavior, coming from sensitization process locally Papakonstantinidis L.A:(2005) In this frame, Intermediate Community is given in terms of a continuous sensitization process, tending to sensitization itself, inside the community

ASSUMPTIONS

1. The main hypothesis is that development (especially, local development) may be sighted as the output of the bargaining trends.
2. Social interactions regularly lead to mutually beneficial transactions that are sometimes puzzling
3. Bargaining is strongly correlated with bargainers behavior (as above mentioned)
4. We could imagine the intra-community relations as a continuous bargain between 2- It is rather a dynamic "winning strategies instant reflections" game, based on competitive interaction relations
5. All players have complete information about the game being played.- J. F. Nah, "instrumental rationality", 1950
6. Sensitization is a kind of "information", making the given information complete – Papakonstantinidis L.A , 2002)
7. Each player has a subjective probability distribution over the alternative possibilities – (Harsanyi, 1967),
8. If a type is associated with several states but cannot distinguish between the states, it assigns a probability distribution over the set of types. If a type is associated with only one state, then that type believes with certainty that it is in that state (Danford B, 2009).
9. The main assumption(Papakonstantinidis, 2004): Introducing the "Intermediate Community", as the third bargainer in a bargain between 2 ,a new state is resulted thus converting a binomial probabilities distribution (Nash win-win equilibrium) into trinomial probabilities distribution, so that each of the three(including the community) to win [win-win-win]
10. The assumption that local development is based on a continuous "sensitization process", trending to the limit end of the process (Papakonstantinidis, 2004), through the bargain: There is an interaction between people's (involved in each of the bargains) behavior and the bargain itself. A dynamic evolution characterizes the interaction which will pass in next generations by the memes Dawkins R(1976)
11. The limit of this continuous process may be proved to be the absolute players' sensitization, leading to the absolute cooperation, which is the best strategy for all the involved players in the bargain (under the Harsanyi's condition of a perfect players information)

A QUICK OVERVIEW ON NASH EQUILIBRIA IN THE FERAME OF A BARGAIN

In Social Sciences, we have to define a Rule such as to meet the majority needs, without neglecting the minority needs: In math terms, we have to define a differential equation in a model, setting the "Nature", "State" in the centre and then finding losses and benefits resulted by deviation from this function-rule This analysis provides us with knowledge in real as well as in non real situation. The bargain is highlighted as a "game", Decisions are concerned as "instant reflection winning strategies" Payoffs are weighting by individual probabilities distributions, by taking into consideration that **each player has complete information** about the other player's information conducted their bargaining behavior (Common Knowledge of Rationality- **C.K.R,** Varoufakis Y, (2001).

THE BARGAIN- NASH THEOREM [Nash J. F. (1951)]

During the decade of 40's John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern had developed the "zero sum two player's game" theory based on "maximin-minimax" strategic decision, as the reaction to a given winning strategy, coming from the other player: Maximizing the minimum profits and/or minimizing the maximum losses. This was a full competitive idea (win-loose) useful only for the war decision making but not for piece period.

Despite the maximin-minimax Neumann approach (Neumann von J., Oscar Morgenstern, 1944) John Forbs Nash proposed in 1951 ("Non Cooperative Game Theory"-Annals of Mathematic, 1951) a "solution" to the problem of how rational players would play, to win - now called Nash equilibrium. According to Nash, a priori coalitions must be excluded, *as they do not generate* "pure individual strategies". In the opposite, a game (bargain) based on *"instant reflection strategies"* may be accepted as it generates pure individual strategies

According to the Bargaining Problem in its math expression *"An n –person game is a set of n players or positions, each with an associate finite set of pure strategies and corresponding to each player i a payoff function pi which maps the set of all n-tuples of pure strategies into the real numbers"* (Kuhun- Nassar, 2000)

A concept of game theory where the optimal outcome of a game is one where no player has an incentive to deviate from his or her chosen strategy after considering an opponent's choice. Overall, an individual can receive no incremental benefit from changing actions, assuming other players remain constant in their strategies. A game may have multiple Nash equilibria or none at all. (invetodedia, 2010)

Following the literature (Kuhn W.H –Nasar S, 2002), Nash's idea, based on the idea of equilibrium in a physical system, was that players would adjust their strategies until no player could benefit from changing. All players are then choosing strategies that are best (utility-maximizing) responses to all the other players' strategies (Colin F. Camerer,(2003). Nash equilibrium is a solution concept of a game involving two or more players, in which each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only his own strategy unilaterally. If each player has chosen a strategy and no player can benefit by changing his or her strategy while the other players keep their unchanged, then the current set of strategy choices and the corresponding payoffs constitute a Nash equilibrium (win- win situation) A game may have multiple Nash equilibria or none at all (Aumann, R. J. 1976). (each strategy in a Nash equilibrium is a best response to all other strategies in that equilibrium(von Ahn, L. Von 2004)

Formal definition of Nash equilibrium Bernheim B. Peleg .D (2004), B., Whinston M. D. , (1987),

Let *(S, f)* be a game with *n* players, where S_i is the strategy set for player *i*, $S=S_1 X S_2 ... X S_n$ is the set of strategy profiles and $f=(f_1(x), ..., f_n(x))$ is the payoff function for $x \in S$. Let x_i be a strategy profile of player *i* and x_{-i} be a strategy profile of all players except for player *i*. When each player $i \in \{1, ..., n\}$ chooses strategy x_i resulting in strategy profile $x = (x_1, ..., x_n)$ then player *i* obtains payoff $f_i(x)$. Note that the payoff depends on the strategy profile chosen, i.e., on the strategy chosen by player *i* as well as the strategies chosen by all the other players. A strategy profile $x^* \in S$ is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if no unilateral deviation in strategy by any single player is profitable for that player, that is

$$\forall i, x_i \in S_i, x_i \neq x_i^* : f_i(x_i^*, x_{-i}^*) \geq f_i(x_i, x_{-i}^*). \quad 1$$

A game can have either a pure-strategy or a mixed Nash Equilibrium, (in the latter a pure strategy is chosen stochastically with a fixed frequency). Nash proved later that if we allow mixed strategies, then every game with a finite number of players in which each player can choose from finitely many pure strategies has, at least, one Nash equilibrium Later (1995) R. Aumann, 1999) and Brandenburger , show that, if players' payoffs are mutually known, their rationality is mutually known, their beliefs (or "conjectures") about other players' actions are commonly known and they have a common prior, then, for each player *j,* the conjectures of all the other players about ;'s action agree and the ŋ-tuple of such conjectures (one conjecture about each player) form a Nash equilibrium when viewed as a mixed strategy profile.

Besides,

If the payoffs are commonly known to all bargainers, then the Common Knowledge of Rationality CKR), is the main Nash assumption. Harsanyi, suggested later (Harsanyi, 1967) that "Complete information requires that every player knows the strategies and payoffs available to the other players **but not necessarily the actions taken**. Games of incomplete information can be reduced, however, to games of imperfect information by introducing "moves by nature"

Bargain may lead either in agreement or disagreement Utility expresses the constraint or the "fear factor"(Papakonstantinidis L.A, (2002,8/14) of disagreement for the negotiator who desires negotiations to be led in agreement more than the other one. Who needs more, negotiation to be led in an agreement expects more utility, but –probably he has to loose in terms of "shares", due to risk lack In the opposite, who is indifferent about "agreement" or expects less utility /per unit, has- to win in "shares" under the dogma *"the more risk, the more profit"* Each of "negotiators" has, therefore to think twice (2-person anticipation) according to his & the other's expectations so both to win, maximising the outcome of negotiation (**win-win)**

JOHN HARSANYI: FROM INCOMPLETE TO IMPRFECT INFORMATION (SUB-GAME)

John Harsanyi made a major contribution to welfare economics by two different interventions:

The first one is often called the "impartial observer argument". An impartial observer should decide for society as if he had an equal chance of becoming anyone in the considered population. This is a risky situation in which the standard decision criterion is expected utility.

The second Harsanyi' s argument, worldwide as the "**aggregation theorem",** is about a social planner who, facing risky prospects, maximizes expected social welfare and wants to respect individual preferences about prospects.

The key step in (Harsanyi's,1955) Harsanyi's argument, based on Bayesian, or conditional probabilities distribution was the claim "….that expected social welfare would be the weighted sum of expected individual utility functions, assuming that whenever all individuals are indifferent between any two probability distributions over social states, then so is society.." (Stanford Encyclopedia, (2001) Players have initial beliefs about the type of each player (**where a belief is a probability distribution over the possible types for a player)** and can update their beliefs according to Bayes' Rule as play takes place in the game. In a Bayesian game, the incompleteness of information means that at least one player is unsure of the type (and so the payoff function) of another player (see below)



Harsanyi grappled with the analysis of "incomplete information's" games, where the players are uncertain about games situation parameters (or even some of them, as payoff functions, or about the other players' information about the game situation etc) Harsanyi's approach for modeling a Bayesian game in such a way, **allows** games of incomplete information to become games of imperfect information.

Games of "incomplete information" (between C- games and I-games) must not be confused with "games of imperfect information", although they have have been extensively discussed in the literature:

The first case concerns games where the players are uncertain about some important parameters of the game situation, such as the payoff functions, the strategies available to various players, the information other players have about the game, etc.

The second case concerns games in which the history of the game is not available to all players.

Besides, "complete information" requires that every player knows the strategies and payoffs available to the other players but not necessarily the actions taken. Games of incomplete information can be reduced, however, to games of imperfect information by introducing "moves by nature"

According to Harsanyi, each player has an objective probability distribution over the alternative possibilities: in this framework, probability distributions for each player is assumed to be mutually consistent or, they can be considered as conditional probability distributions derived from a **certain "basic probability distribution"** over the parameters, which are unknown to different players, even if ,it was assumed (by literature) that these probability distributions entertained by the different players are mutually "consistent", in the sense that they can be regarded as conditional probability distributions derived from a certain "basic probability distribution" over the parameters unknown to the various players. However, the theory meets also those cases where the different players' subjective probability distributions fail to satisfy the above assumption (the condition of mutually consistency for the players' probability distributions). According to Harsanyi J. (Harsanyi, (1967), in cases where the consistency assumption holds, the original game can be replaced by a game **where nature first conducts a lottery in accordance with the basic probability distribution,** and the outcome of this lottery will decide which particular sub-game will be played. However, every player will know the "basic probability distribution" governing the lottery.

Following Harsanyi's concept, a Bayesian game can be modeled by **introducing Nature as a player in a game.** Nature assigns a random variable to each player which could take values of *types* for each player and associating probabilities, In this **nature** randomly **chooses** a type for each player according to the probability distribution across each player's type space). Finally, Harsanyi utilitarian theorem (Stanford Encyclopedia, 2001) states that the **social welfare function** is the weighted sum of individuals' utility functions if: **(i) society maximizes expected social welfare; (ii) individuals maximize expected utility; (iii) society is indifferent between two probability distributions over social states whenever all individuals are.**

Formal definition (Harsanyi, 1967),

The game is defined as: $G = \langle N, \Omega, \langle A_i, u_i, T_i, \tau_i, p_i, C_i \rangle_{i \in N} \rangle$, where: 3

G = game definition

1. *N* is the set of players.
2. Ω is the set of the states of the nature. For instance, in a card game, it can be any order of the cards.
3. A_i is the set of actions for player i. Let $A = A_1 \times A_2 \times \ldots A_N$. 4
4. T_i is the types of player i, decided by the function $\tau_i : \Omega \rightarrow T_i$. So for each state of the nature, the game will have different types of players. The outcome of the players is what determines its type. Players with the same outcome belong to the same type.
5. $C_i \subseteq A_i \times T_i$ defines the available actions for player i of some type in T_i. 5
6. $u_i : \Omega \times A \rightarrow R$ is the payoff function for player i 6

PROPOSAL

Starting from the Harsanyi's refinement concerning the Nash equilibrium, the objective of this paper was to formulate an argument on how it should be possible to provide appropriate tools for local development, taking into consideration the suggested "sensitization process" (behavioral analysis) and its interaction with the bargain and during the bargain. For this purpose, we have to suggest the "Intermediate Community" in a bargain between 2 , but not as the result of transferring a game of incomplete information to a game of imperfect information. According to the paper's proposal, the "Intermediate Community" (Nature as a player in the Game which first conducts a lottery in accordance with the basic probability distribution) must be seen as conscious choice, taken by local people in the frame of sensitization process: Sensitized people should conduct their bargaining behavior in a "new" type of bargain, less competitive, more cooperative, even if adopting the "Non Cooperative" instant reflection winning strategies' concept for modeling a Bayesian game in such a way, **allows**

competitive games of incomplete information to become more cooperative games of perfect information: sensitization, may be one of factors influenced this sep-by-step change at the local level (see the LEADER EU Initiative's application in Greece (Papakonstantinidis L.A, 2003), during the 1991-1994 period

The limit of the continuous sensitization process defines a new behavioral status, in the bargain between 2, which trends from pure competition to the absolute cooperation, which is the best of all instant reflection, individual winning strategies

The suggested "Intermediate Community model" (see at the triangle relation scheme below) or "win-win-win papakonstantinidis model"(as any of the 3 parts of the negotiation has to win from this) is the end/purpose of this paper's contribution

Especially,

- Introducing the "Intermediate Community" – ("C" factor) as the THIRD (invisible) part in a bargain between 2 provides us with a "sensitization measure" to go the local development on Bargaining belief , in that case, should be continuously strengthen, thus tending to the limit of a pure and absolute cooperation, especially in an Inequality Age, due to capital accumulation (Amin Samir , 1970)
- Defining the Intermediate Community in terms of a continuous sensitization process, at the local level with social and endogenous characteristics. These may be seen as the output of the continuous sensitization process AND perfect information (the sensitization)

lim Pi(&) Qi(&) Ri(&) = max Ua Ub Uc

i→∞ 7

Pi(&)..strategy under the Pi,..probabilities distribution,

Ua.. utility functions

or, how to transform a "competition" into the absolute cooperation, taking into account the integrated information, coming from knowledge transfer AND the sensitization process in the community, thus maximizing bargainers utilities and the Community utility (Uc) (Papakonstantinidis L.A, 2002).

SCHEME OF A 3-PART BARGAINING APPROACH



Papakonstantinidis, 2002

Now, we have to reproduce the Harsanyi Bayesian game's formal definition, with some difference which is the paper's contribution: introducing the "Intermediate Community" as the 3rd imaginary part of the negotiation between 2, as well as weighting of certain variables with coefficients, it should be possible to define the suggested "win-win-win papakonstantinidis model"

The sensitized players' game is defined as:





1. *N* is the set of players.

2. Ω* is the set of the states of the "Intermediate Community", depended on local people bargaining intra-community behavior

3. A_i is the set of actions for player i. Let $A = A_1 \times A_2 \times ...A_N$. 10

4. T_i is the types of player i, decided by the function $\tau_i : \Omega \rightarrow T_i$. So for each state of the nature, the game will have different types of players. The outcome of the players is what determines its type. Players with the same outcome belong to the same type.

5. $C_i \subseteq A_i \times T_i$ defines the available actions for player i of some type in T_i. 11

6. $u_i : \Omega \times A \rightarrow R$ is the payoff function for player i 12

7. **ϕ** : the **sensitization** coefficient of Ti : Each state of the Community (Nature, Local Community, Physical Environment etc) must be (according to model definition) weighted by the"ϕ" appropriate sensitization coefficient of Ti, thus providing behavioral convergence towards community prevailing ethos(John Friedman, Clyde Weaver ,1979)

Finally,

- Nash equilibrium is based on binomial probabilities (p, 1-p) distribution, corresponding 1-1 with those utility functions "prices" (disagreement fear factor). In its extension, the author hypothesizes that the Intermediate Community (the "C" factor) produces a new behavioural type that converges the interests of both sides at a local level. By converting a binomial distribution (p, 1-p) into a trinomial distribution, (p_1, p_2, $1-p_1-p_2$) combined with 3 utility function "prices", the dynamic behavioural sensitization process may converge into the integrated local development limit–end.
- Paper focus on local level's behavior by a rural, social and ecological development's methodological tool, worldwide known as win-win-win papakonstantinidis model, taking into consideration the memes approach (Blackmore S, 1999) influenced biological and cultural "behavior" for the next generations (Dawkins Richard ,1976)
- Paper adopts the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (Harsanyi) which defines the strategy profile and beliefs specified for each player about the types of the other players that maximizes the expected payoff for each player given their beliefs about the other players' types and given the strategies played by the other players.
- Sensitization" may be concerned as information, thus changed the 2parts imperfect information, into a complete information as Harsanyi conditional probabilities claims
- Each of players following his/her best individual instant reflection winning strategy, having perfect information, as well as initial beliefs about the type of each player where a belief is a probability distribution over the possible types for a player) can update his/her beliefs as play takes place in the game (according to Bayesian Rule)
- Introducing the "Community" as the "third" part in a bargain between 2, we can imagine a "new bargain type" in which the "Community" (Nature, common values, ethic etc) is included
- That is reflected in bargainers behaviour, tending to the sensitization, in its limit-end (perfect sensitization, at the local level)
- Coming from the above, the resulted behaviour leads into the absolute cooperation, which steps on the same rules of globalization. The paper, then, argues that this resulted behaviour reflects the end point of the local development process. That is the end of sensitization process

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